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Moral decision making involves affective and cognitive functions like emotional empathy,
reasoning and cognitive empathy/theory of mind (ToM), which are discussed to be
subject to age-related alterations. Additionally, sex differences in moral decision making
have been reported. However, age-related changes in moral decision making from
early to late adulthood and their relation to sex and neuropsychological functions have
not been studied yet. One hundred ninety seven participants (122 female), aged 19–
86 years, were tested with a moral decision making task comprising forced choice
“everyday life” situations in which an altruistic option that favors a socially accepted
alternative had to be considered against an egoistic option that favors personal benefit
over social interests. The percentage of altruistic decisions was analyzed. A structural
equation model (SEM) was calculated to test the hypothesis whether age and sex
predict altruistic moral decision, and whether relevant neuropsychological domains
mediate these hypothesized relationships. A significant relationship between age and
moral decision making was found indicating more frequent altruistic decisions with
increasing age. Furthermore, women decided more altruistically than men. The SEM
showed that both age and sex are significant predictors of altruistic moral decision
making, mediated by emotional empathy but not by reasoning. No cognitive empathy
and ToM scores were correlated to age and moral decision making at the same time and
thus were not included in the SEM. Our data suggest that increasing age and female
sex have an effect on altruistic moral decisions, but that this effect is fully mediated
by emotional empathy. The fact that changes of moral decision making with age are
mediated by emotional empathy can be interpreted in the light of the so-called “positivity
effect” and increasing avoidance of negative affect in aging. The mediated sex effect
might represent both biological aspects and socialized sex roles for higher emotional
empathy leading to more altruistic decisions.
Keywords: moral decision making, aging, sex, empathy, reasoning, theory of mind
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INTRODUCTION
Moral decision making is based on the complex integration of
affective and cognitive processes (e.g., Greene et al., 2004; Decety
et al., 2011; Patterson et al., 2012). Although aging is accompanied
by changes of affective and cognitive processes (Glisky, 2007;
Ardelt, 2011; Charles, 2011), research on moral decision making
in healthy participants has mainly focused on childhood and
young adulthood (e.g., Decety et al., 2011). The aim of the current
study is to examine moral decision making from early to late
adulthood and to define the influence of age-related changes
in affective and cognitive processing. Based on recent evidence
for sex differences in moral decision making (Fumagalli et al.,
2010a,b; Youssef et al., 2012; Migliore et al., 2014), sex and its
relation to age is also investigated.
Moral decision making comprises decisions that are subject to
generally accepted and culturally shaped moral norms of behavior
(Reynolds and Ceranic, 2007; Moll and Schulkin, 2009). Thus,
disadvantageous moral decision making has socially unfavorable
outcomes (e.g., Haviv and Leman, 2002) or even involve legal
consequences (e.g., Blair, 1995).
Affective functions substantially contribute to moral decision
making (Haidt, 2001); it is modulated by an individual’s affective
state (Polman and Ruttan, 2011) and emotional awareness
(Koven, 2011). Evidence on a physiological level is given by
Starcke et al. (2011), who induced stress to a sample of healthy
participants and found that the increase of cortisol is related
to egoistic moral decisions in high emotional, but not in low
emotional moral conflicts. Aversive emotional reactions related
to stress seem to interfere with positive affect that was found
associated with altruistic moral decisions (Starcke et al., 2011).
Therefore, situational emotionality and intra-individual affective
processing seem to be important for the modulation of moral
decisions. In particular, emotional empathy, i.e., the spontaneous
emotional reaction to experiences of other people (Davis, 1983),
considerably contributes to moral decision making (e.g., Decety
et al., 2011; Gleichgerrcht and Young, 2013). More specifically,
Batson (2010) found that empathic concern, as a measure of
emotional empathy, motivates altruistic behavior and hereby
highlights prosocial goals. There is some evidence for differences
between younger and older adults regarding empathic concern
on the one hand and moral decision making on the other
hand (e.g., Gleichgerrcht and Young, 2013). However, evidence
for a correlational relationship between emotional empathy and
moral decision making rather than group differences is scarce
(Gleichgerrcht and Young, 2013). Furthermore, the existing data
on the role of emotional empathic reactions in the context
of moral decisions was assessed for extreme moral dilemma
situations (i.e., situations that deal with matters of life and death)
and its validation for everyday moral situations hitherto is an
open issue.
With regard to cognitive processes, executive control has
been related to difficult moral decisions in extreme dilemmas
that require moral tradeoffs in situations with high personal
involvement, e.g., actively pushing a stranger off a bridge
in order to save five others (Greene et al., 2004). In these
decisions, executive control was proposed to support the
overcoming of salient and intuitive options (Kahane et al.,
2012). Reasoning abilities are important to exercise executive
control in moral situations, because reasoning is substantially
involved in cognitive conflict resolution and emotion regulation
(Patterson et al., 2012). In this respect, reasoning can profoundly
shape moral permissibility ratings (Paxton et al., 2012) and
help to reflect on emotional responses to external contingencies
(Koven, 2011; Tassy et al., 2012), like anticipated personal
and impersonal consequences (Jeurissen et al., 2014). Whereas
reasoning and executive control seem to facilitate utilitarian
decisions in extreme moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2004; Paxton
et al., 2012), one could suppose that in everyday moral situations
egoistic options are promoted, because egoistic decisions provoke
aversive affective states that need to be overcome (Sommer
et al., 2010; Rosen et al., 2013). However, no relationship
between reasoning and egoistic everyday moral decisions has
been reported so far.
Additionally, theory of mind (ToM) – the ability to infer
mental states of others (Adolphs, 2001) – has been shown to be
relevant for moral decision making (Young et al., 2010; Zalla
et al., 2011). Especially permissibility ratings of intentional and
accidental moral transgressions are modulated by ToM (Killen
et al., 2011) so that intentional harm is condemned stricter
(Young et al., 2010). Also, the pursuit of one’s own personal
interest can be facilitated by ToM (Press and Dyson, 2012;
Weiland et al., 2012), and ToM might promote egoistic decisions
in everyday moral conflict situations (Rosen et al., 2013). In
contrast, increased activation of ToM-related brain areas was
associated with altruistic everyday moral decisions in adolescents
(Sommer et al., 2014). Thus, the question remains how ToM
influences everyday moral decision making.
Age-related affective and cognitive changes from young to
late adulthood relate to functions that are associated to moral
decision making. There are differences between younger and
older adults in their experience and regulation of affective states.
Elderly people report stronger emotional arousal if stressors
cannot be avoided (Stawski et al., 2008). On the other hand,
they show more effective coping strategies to manage these
stressors (e.g., Charles et al., 2009; Grossmann et al., 2010).
Furthermore, motivational changes relate to affective processing
of older adults. In detail, older people show a tendency to
avoid negative and approach positive stimuli (Charles et al.,
2009), also referred to as “positivity effect.” The positivity effect
has been discussed in the context of evidence for a relative
stability of emotional well-being in older adults despite physical
and cognitive deterioration (termed “aging paradox,” Charles
and Carstensen, 2010). Accordingly, older people more often
try to de-escalade interpersonal conflict situations (Grossmann
et al., 2010) and show greater acceptance of negative emotions
than younger adults (Shallcross et al., 2013). Evidence for age-
related changes of emotional empathy has been reported, with
controversial results concerning the question whether emotional
empathy increases (Gould and Macneil Gautreau, 2014), declines
(May and Alligood, 2000), or remains stable with advancing age
(Bailey et al., 2008), or both variables show an inverse-U-shaped
relationship (O’Brien et al., 2013). Despite these controversial
findings, it was recently shown that emotional empathic reactions
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more strongly motivates older than younger adults to exhibit
prosocial behavior (Beadle et al., 2015). The relation between
age, emotional empathy and everyday moral decision making
has not been investigated in one comprehensive experimental
design yet.
Cognitive aging is characterized by a decline of episodic
memory, working memory and executive functions (e.g., Glisky,
2007; Phillips et al., 2011). Age-related non-moral decision
making difficulties seem to be related to decline in global
cognitive functioning and executive functions (Brand and
Markowitsch, 2010). Executive functions are composed of a
heterogeneous set of subfunctions that substantially serve the
exercise and maintenance of cognitive control (Patterson et al.,
2012; Diamond, 2013). In this context, age effects on cognitive
flexibility and reasoning (e.g., Borghesani et al., 2013) are of
special interest (Paxton et al., 2012), because the resolution of
cognitive conflict and regulation of emotional arousal induced
by moral situations (Greene et al., 2004; Patterson et al., 2012)
are likely to be affected by age-related alterations of executive
functions and reasoning (Paxton et al., 2012), e.g., concerning
the overcoming of moral intuitions (Kahane et al., 2012). As
with emotional empathy, inconsistent evidence has been reported
for age-related changes in measures of cognitive empathy like
perspective taking or ToM scores, including evidence for stability
(Keightley et al., 2006), decline (Bailey et al., 2008; Charlton et al.,
2009), and an inverse-U-shaped pattern (Phillips et al., 2011;
O’Brien et al., 2013) which implies a decrease at least for the
late adulthood. A deterioration of cognitive empathy/ToM seems
to be partially mediated by the decline of executive functions
(Charlton et al., 2009; Phillips et al., 2011) but also partly
independent from executive processing (Kemp et al., 2012). In
summary, age-related changes of cognitive empathy/ToM are
probable and – as outlined above – their influence on alterations
of moral decision making reasonable.
On the basis of age-related affective and cognitive changes
as well as on preliminary evidence for age-related changes of
moral permissibility ratings in late adulthood (Moran et al.,
2012), it is likely that alterations of moral decision making
also occur with increasing age from young to late adulthood.
When evaluating the permissibility of moral transgressions,
older adults’ judgments are more strongly driven by outcome
than younger adults’ judgments, meaning that older adults less
likely consider the intentions of a moral agent (Moran et al.,
2012). This result was interpreted in the context of age-related
declines in cognitive empathy/ToM and changes in motivational
information processing.
Given the knowledge about neuropsychological mechanisms
of moral decision making: Why should aging affect this process?
In fact, there are at least three arguments: First, age-related
changes of affective processing have been reported, which are
relevant for moral decision making (e.g., Beadle et al., 2015).
Second, changes in cognitive functions that are related to moral
decision making have been found to be altered with advancing
age (e.g., Borghesani et al., 2013). Third, elderly people show
(non-moral) decision making difficulties under conditions of
risk and ambiguity that affect their everyday life, because they
show problems to estimate risks and are prone to dubious
offers (Denburg et al., 2007; Brand and Markowitsch, 2010).
Moreover, a moderation of the relationship between age and
risky decision making by executive functions and reasoning
abilities was reported (Brand and Schiebener, 2013). Based on
these arguments, the current study investigates the question, how
age-related affective and cognitive changes influence possible
age-related alterations of moral decision making.
Recently, first neuroscientific evidence was published that
point to sex differences in moral decision making for extreme
situations. Fumagalli et al. (2010a) showed that men more often
override intuitive moral options in highly emotional and difficult
moral dilemmas than women do. This indicates that men decide
moral trade-offs rather pragmatically and despite the risk of harm
for others whereas women decide more empathically and caring
for others at risk (Fumagalli et al., 2010a). Additionally, the
frequency of choices that result from overridden intuitive options
could be manipulated by transcranial direct current stimulation
of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in women, but not in
men (Fumagalli et al., 2010b), indicating that moral decisions
appear to be more easily modified by external factors in women
whereas men’s moral decisions are more robust against external
(emotional) cues (Fumagalli et al., 2010a,b). Youssef et al. (2012)
demonstrated that under conditions of stress females tend to
make less utilitarian moral decisions than males. However, the
outlined data was found for moral decisions made in extreme
(not everyday) moral dilemma situations and were not discussed
in relation to age. The current study tries to transfer these
results to everyday moral decision making and investigates
its relation between age, sex and related neuropsychological
measures: It has been shown that women score higher on
emotional empathy (O’Brien et al., 2013), whereas results for sex
differences regarding executive functions (Gur et al., 2012; Kim
et al., 2013) and cognitive empathy/ToM (Pavlova, 2009; Ahmed
and Miller, 2011) are insconsistent. While no sex differences
in executive functions were found by Kim et al. (2013), Gur
et al. (2012) report that women outperform men in reasoning
speed whereas male show better performance in spatial tests. Sex
differences for ToM were found in the Faux Pas test, but not in
the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Ahmed and Miller, 2011).
As outlined above, the main affective and cognitive functions
that are discussed in the context of moral decision making on the
one hand and age-related changes as well as sex differences on
the other hand are emotional empathy, (executive) reasoning and
cognitive empathy/ToM. Therefore we focus these functions in
the current investigation as possible mediators for age and sex
effects on moral decision making.
Our hypotheses are: Advanced age and female sex positively
influence the proportion of altruistic decisions in everyday moral
conflict situations. Given that age and sex have an effect on
emotional empathy, and emotional empathy should positively
influence altruistic moral decisions, it can be expected that the
age and sex effects on moral decision making are mediated by
emotional empathy.
Likewise, as both (executive) reasoning and cognitive
empathy/ToM have been shown to be related to moral decision
making as well as age and sex (although with conflicting results
with regard to the direction of these relationships, as described
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above), we hypothesize that age and sex effects on moral decision
making are – in addition to emotional empathy – mediated by
executive reasoning and cognitive empathy/ToM.
To test these hypotheses, an everyday moral decision making
task that was already used in former studies (Starcke et al.,
2011; Rosen et al., 2013) and revised and validated recently
(Rosen et al., 2015) as well as an elaborate neuropsychological
test battery were applied to healthy participants between 19 and
90 years of age. In order to test the influence of age and sex
on moral decision making as well as possible neuropsychological
mediators, a structural equation model (SEM) was calculated.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Procedure
The study was approved by the local ethics committee (Nr.
02-13). All participants gave written informed consent to the
study and study procedure. Participants were recruited among
employees and students of the University of Vechta as well
as their relatives and friends. No financial compensation was
given. Because of the complexity of our outcome variable (i.e.,
moral decision making), at best small to medium effects could be
expected in the calculated correlational analyses. On the basis of
power analyses, it was determined that at least 175 participants
should be tested to achieve a power of 98% for medium effects
(ρ = 0.30) and a power of 80% for small, but still meaningful
effects (ρ = 0.21). Within the aimed sample of 175 participants,
it was defined that it should preferably consist of balanced
subsamples for every decade between 20 (including 18 and
19 year old participants which are adults according to German
jurisdiction) and 90 years of age. Besides age between 18 and
90 years and female or male sex, further inclusion criteria were
German mother tongue or very good German language skills and
intact or sufficiently corrected vision and hearing for the testing
procedures. Inclusion criteria were that participants were male or
female adults between 18 and 90 years of age with German as their
mother tongue or very good knowledge of German language.
Additionally, participants were only enrolled in the study, if
they gave informed consent to the study. Exclusion criteria were
reports of current or past neurologic or psychiatric diseases
as well as current alcohol or drug abuse, an age-inappropriate
general cognitive state as measured by the DemTect (Kalbe et al.,
2004, cut-off: score <13), and severe clinical symptoms of a
depression as measured by the German version (Hautzinger et al.,
2009) of the Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II, Beck et al.,
1996, cut-off: score >28). Participants who showed increased
social desirability as indicated by the Social Desirability Scale 17
(SDS-17, Stöber, 2001, cut-off: score >15) were also excluded.
This cut-off score was chosen referring to 1.5 standard deviations
above the mean score of the fourth validation sample in Stöber
(2001), because it best matches the current sample in terms of age
and education.
Participants
A total sample of 197 healthy participants from 19 to 86 years
of age (M = 45.98, SD = 18.39) who met the inclusion criteria
were enrolled in the study. The case numbers of the aimed
age subsamples included 47 participants (26 female) aged 18–
29 years, 32 participants (21 female) aged 30–39 years, 34
participants (21 female) aged 40–49 years, 36 participants (21
female) aged 50–59 years, 20 participants (13 female) aged 60
and 69 years, 21 participants (15 female) aged 70–79 years
and seven participants (five female) aged 80 and 89 years.
Sociodemographic and neuropsychological characteristics of the
study sample are displayed in Table 1.
Neuropsychological Test Battery
Besides the screening instruments that were used to exclude
cognitive dysfunction and severe depressive symptoms as well
as increased social desirability, all participants completed a
neuropsychological test battery including instruments to assess
intelligence as well as tests to examine functions that are relevant
for moral decision making, i.e., emotional empathy, (executive)
reasoning and cognitive empathy/ToM.
Intelligence was assessed using the German “Mehrfach
Wortschatz Test-B” (MWT-B, Lehrl, 2005) which measures
general intelligence.
Emotional empathy was assessed by the “empathic concern”
scale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI, Paulus,
2009), which assesses the tendency to “experience feelings of
compassion” and concern for others (Davis, 1983). Furthermore,
the factors “emotional sensitivity” and “emotional concern” of
the German version of the E-Scale (Leibetseder et al., 2007)
were used, because they represent emotional reactivity to social
situations.
Taken from the German intelligence test battery
“Leistungsprüfsystem” (LPS, Sturm et al., 1993), the fourth
subtest (LPS-4) was applied to examine reasoning abilities.
In addition, reasoning was assessed by the measurement of
executive functions that are associated to reasoning and cognitive
control, i.e., cognitive flexibility and planning (Diamond, 2013).
Cognitive flexibility was assessed by a computerized version of
the Modified Card Sorting Test (MCST, Nelson, 1976). Planning
was measured by the Key Search Test, which was taken from
the Behavioral Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome test
battery (BADS, Wilson et al., 1996).
Theory of mind was measured using a German version
of the “Reading the mind in the Eyes” Test (RMET, Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001). Additionally, the “perspective taking”
scale from the German version of the IRI (Paulus, 2009),
that assesses the ability to adopt other people’s perspective
(Davis, 1983) as a measure of cognitive empathy, was used.
Furthermore, the E-Scale (Leibetseder et al., 2007) factors
“cognitive-sensitivity” and “cognitive-concern” were applied. In
this study, established definitions of cognitive empathy/ToM
and emotional empathy are used, that regard ToM as the
cognitive inference of mental states, and therefore overlaps
cognitive facets of empathy, whereas emotional empathy is
regarded as the emotional resonance with affective states of others
(e.g., Hojat et al., 2011; Kemp et al., 2012). Thus, we include
cognitive empathy/ToM as a composite factor into our SEM
that represents a domain of overlapping concepts. Based on
the data published by the authors of the E-Scale (Leibetseder
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TABLE 1 | Sociodemographic characteristics and neuropsychological test results.
All participants
(N = 197)
Females (n = 122) Males (n = 75) Sex effects
Measure Max. Range M SD M SD M SD t(195) p d
Sociodemographic variables
Age (years) 19−86 45.98 18.39 47.02 18.83 44.31 17.65 1.00 0.317 0.15
Educationa (years) 7−18 13.41 2.44 13.24 2.27 13.66 2.66 −1.11 0.270 0.17
General cognitive state
DEMTECT 18 13−18 16.98 1.31 17.12 1.22 16.75 1.43 1.89 0.061 0.28
Depression
BDI-II 63 0−27 6.96 5.80 7.48 5.96 6.12 5.45 1.60 0.111 0.23
Social desirability
SDS-17 17 0−15 9.22 3.34 9.46 3.31 8.84 3.37 1.27 0.208 0.19
Intelligence
MWT-Bb – 16−99 72.16 23.16 71.97 23.16 72.48 23.31 −0.15 0.881 0.02
Emotional empathy
IRI empathic concern 20 7−36 14.10 3.26 14.67 2.46 13.17 4.11 3.20 0.002 0.47
E-Scale Emotional sensitivity 30 6−49 19.24 5.40 20.06 5.51 17.91 4.97 2.77 0.006 0.40
Emotional concern 35 12−35 24.65 4.75 25.80 4.17 22.79 5.07 4.52 <0.001 0.66
Reasoning
LPS-4 raw score 40 9−38 27.52 4.93 27.04 5.05 28.29 4.67 −1.74 0.084 0.25
LPS-4 normed scorec – 10−85 58.64 11.85 58.75 10.40 58.47 13.96 0.17 0.869 0.02
Executive functions
MCST Correct 48 14−48 40.86 6.44 40.04 6.67 42.19 5.87 −2.37 0.019 0.34
Errors – 0−22 5.82 4.60 6.42 4.76 4.85 4.20 2.41 0.017 0.34
Perseverations – 0−12 1.32 2.38 1.54 2.62 0.96 1.90 1.80 0.073 0.24
Key search test 16 0−16 11.49 4.34 11.23 4.59 11.92 3.91 −1.08 0.280 0.16
Cognitive empathy/ToM
RMET 36 6−34 23.36 5.51 23.45 4.59 23.20 4.40 0.38 0.706 0.06
IRI perspective taking 20 7−36 14.93 3.00 15.07 2.50 14.72 3.67 0.79 0.433 0.12
E-Scale Cognitive sensitivity 25 5−25 15.42 4.77 15.87 4.61 14.69 4.98 1.69 0.093 0.25
Cognitive concern 25 6−25 15.67 3.90 16.22 3.68 14.81 4.10 2.50 0.013 0.37
Order in the table does not represent the order of task application (which is reported in the procedures section); Max., possible maximum score; BDI-II, Beck Depression
Inventory-II; MWT-B, Mehrfach Wortschatz Test-B (German intelligence test, see text); LPS, Leistungsprüfsystem (German intelligence test battery, see text); MCST,
Modified Card Sorting Test; IRI, Interpersonal Reactivity Index; ToM, Theory of mind; RMET, Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task; SDS-17, Social Desirability Scale 17 (see
text); asum of school and professional education; bnormed percentage scores; cnormed T scores.
et al., 2007), the four factors of the E-Scale were divided in
two emotional empathy factors and two cognitive empathy
factors that were assigned to cognitive empathy/ToM functions
as defined above. The “cognitive” empathy factors require active
reflection on social situations or change of perspective and
therefore fit to the cognitive empathy/ToM definition applied
in the current paper, whereas the “emotional” empathy factors
represent spontaneous emotional empathizing corresponding to
the definition of emotional empathy applied in the current
paper.
Moral Decision Making Task
A revised version of an everyday moral decision making task
(Starcke et al., 2011; Rosen et al., 2013) was applied that
was validated and already used in its revised form in another
study (Rosen et al., 2015). The task consists of 20 short
stories which describe moral dilemma situations that could
potentially resemble personal experience of the participants or
be encountered during the participants’ future life. All situations
were designed to cause cognitive conflict and high personal
involvement. For each situation, participants have to decide
between a morally desirable and a personally preferable behavior.
The revised form of the moral decision making task was validated
with regard to the nature of the morally desirable (“altruistic”)
and personally preferable (“egoistic”) options as well as to their
emotionality and their similarity to everyday real-life situations
in a previous study (for further details and the complete set of
stories please see supplement of Rosen et al., 2015). Items of low,
medium and high (statistical) item difficulty were chosen within
subsets of high and low emotional stories, so that floor or ceiling
effects do not have to be expected.
The total set of short stories is composed of 10 high emotional
and 10 low emotional stories that address the reader as the main
actor. An example for a high emotional story is: “On the stairs
you meet your disliked neighbor who is not feeling well, asking
you if you give him a lift to see a doctor. Do you help your
neighbor?” An example for a low emotional story is: “In a hurry
you arrive at a red pedestrian stoplight, where a school class is
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already waiting for the light to turn green. Do you cross the
street?” The task was presented to the participants as pen and
paper questionnaire. All participants were instructed to refer
to the first situation that comes to their mind while they read
the stories. Hereby, situations would easily be imaginable and
would thus provoke high personal involvement and increase
ecological validity. At the end of every story, participants were
asked a forced choice “yes” or “no” question whether or not
they would choose a proposed “egoistic” (personally preferable)
or “altruistic” (morally desirable) behavior, if they were part of
the described situation. Half of the proposed behaviors were
designed to be egoistic (n = 10) while the other half (n = 10)
were altruistic, with five high and five low emotional stories in
both sets. Word count and word lengths were matched for all
subsets of stories. For high emotional, low emotional, and the
whole set of stories, the percentage of altruistic decisions was
calculated.
Statistical Analysis
Standard statistical data analyses were carried out using IBM
SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 20.0 (Armonk, IBM
Corp.). Variables were tested for normal distribution using the
Kolmogorov–Smirnov (K–S) test. Because of the large sample
size (N > 30), even small deviations of normal distribution are
detected by the K–S test (Cohen et al., 2003; Bortz et al., 2008). In
this case, graphical methods were applied to estimate the degree
of deviation from normality and to check for possible outliers
(e.g., Cohen et al., 2003; Bortz et al., 2008), using histograms, Q–
Q plots and boxplots. If deviations from normal distribution were
considered to be small and hence biased results were not to be
expected, parametric analyses that are robust against normality
violation were applied (e.g., Rasch and Guiard, 2004; Bortz et al.,
2008).
For interval scaled variables that satisfy the above outlined
requirements, independent group differences were tested by
the Student’s t-test for independent samples, analyses of
variance (ANOVA) for more than two groups and analyses
of covariance (ANCOVA), if the influence of additional
variables was controlled for. Interval scaled within subjects
comparisons were conducted by Student’s t-test for repeated
measures.
For ordinal variables and in case of deviations from normal
distribution that were considered to be large enough to bias
obtained results or if homogeneity of variance was violated
as indicated by Levene’s test, non-parametric analyses were
calculated. Independent group differences were calculated with
the Mann–Whitney-U-Test or Kruskal–Wallis-Test. Differences
between nominal variables were examined applying the chi-
square (X2) goodness of fit test.
Relationships between variables were examined with Pearson
product-moment correlations and partial correlations in case of
approximately normally distributed variables.
The alpha level was set to 5% for all tests and Bonferroni
correction for multiple testing was applied where necessary.
All tests were performed two-tailed. Cohen’s d effect sizes
for univariate between-group differences were calculated using
pooled standard deviation.
The SEM analysis was carried out using MPlus 6 (Muthén
and Muthén, 2011). There was no missing data. Latent variables
were indicated by two manifest variables that were chosen
based on theoretical considerations outlined above. For mediator
analyses, indicator variables were required to correlate with
age and sex as predictors and moral decision making as
outcome variable (Baron and Kenny, 1986). The model fit
was evaluated using standard criteria (Hu and Bentler, 1995,
1999): The standard root mean square residual (SRMR; values
below 0.08 indicate a good fit with the data), comparative
fit indices, i.e., the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and Tucker
Lewis Index (TLI; values above 0.90 acceptable fit; values
above 0.95 indicate excellent fit), and the root mean square
error of approximation (RMSEA; “test of close fit”; a value
below 0.08 with a significance value below 0.05 indicates
acceptable fit). Confidence intervals (CI) are reported where
appropriate.
RESULTS
Sociodemographic data and neuropsychological test results are
shown in Table 1. All cognitive measures were in the normal
range. General intelligence was measured slightly above average,
while reasoning performance as measured by the LPS-4 was
average. A total of 27.1% of all participants exhibited mild or very
mild depressive symptoms.
Moral Decision Making and Age
Age was significantly associated with overall moral decision
making (r = 0.24, p < 0.001) indicating that altruistic decisions
increase with age (Table 2). Moreover, age was significantly
related to low emotional (r = 0.29 p < 0.001), but not high
emotional (r = 0.08, p = 0.247) moral decisions (Table 2)
indicating that the aging effect in overall moral decisions can
primarily be traced back to decisions in low emotional dilemma
situations.
Participants made significantly more altruistic decisions in
high than in low emotional moral situations, t(196) = 5.34,
p < 0.001. Results of the moral decision making task and sex
effects are listed in Table 3.
Relationships between Age, Moral
Decision Making and Variables of
Empathy, Executive Functions and
Cognitive Empathy/ToM
Correlations between age and moral decision making scores
with measures for emotional empathy, executive functions, and
cognitive empathy/ToM were calculated as prerequisite for the
intended mediation analyses (Table 2). Age was significantly
correlated with reasoning operationalized with the LPS-4 four
raw score, emotional empathy as measured by the E-Scale
scores emotional sensitivity and emotional concern, cognitive
flexibility and planning as operationalized with the MCST and
the Key search test, and cognitive empathy/ToM as assessed with
the RMET and the cognitive sensitivity factor of the E-Scale.
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r P r p r p r p
Moral decision makinga
All dilemma stories 0.24 <0.001 – – 0.76 <0.001 0.86 <0.001
High emotional stories 0.08 0.247 0.76 <0.001 – – 0.35 <0.001
Low emotional stories 0.29 <0.001 0.86 <0.001 0.35 <0.001 – –
Emotional empathy
IRI empathic concern 0.10 0.163 0.36 <0.001 0.33 <0.001 0.26 <0.001
E-Scale Emotional sensitivity −0.19 0.007 −0.03 0.715 −0.02 0.772 −0.02 0.770
Emotional concern 0.23 0.001 0.36 <0.001 0.26 <0.001 0.32 <0.001
Reasoning
LPS-4 raw score −0.43 <0.001 −0.15 0.035 −0.07 0.312 −0.16 0.022
LPS-4 normed scoreb −0.01 0.872 0.13 0.070 0.15 0.033 0.07 0.329
Executive functions
MCST Correct −0.45 <0.001 −0.18 0.011 −0.07 0.345 −0.21 0.003
Errors 0.43 <0.001 0.16 0.027 0.05 0.518 0.19 0.007
Perseverations 0.37 <0.001 0.18 0.010 0.09 0.192 0.20 0.006
Key search test −0.35 <0.001 −0.11 0.133 0.03 0.638 −0.18 0.010
Cognitive empathy/ToM
RMET −0.29 <0.001 −0.02 0.788 0.02 0.735 −0.04 0.543
IRI perspective taking −0.01 0.941 0.18 0.013 0.14 0.057 0.15 0.037
E-Scale Cognitive sensitivity −0.19 0.007 0.00 0.993 −0.02 0.772 −0.02 0.770
Cognitive concern 0.12 0.101 0.17 0.019 0.14 0.058 0.14 0.049
Reported p-values are uncorrected; LPS, Leistungsprüfsystem (German intelligence test battery, see text); MCST, Modified Card Sorting Test; IRI, Interpersonal Reactivity
Index; ToM, Theory of mind; RMET, Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task; aPercentage of altruistic decisions; bnormed T scores.
TABLE 3 | Moral decision making in the overall sample as well as in female and male participants.
Variable All participants (N = 197) Females (n = 122) Males (n = 75) Sex effects
Max. Range M SD M SD M SD t(195) p d
Moral decision makinga
All dilemma stories 100 25–95 67.37 14.15 68.89 13.77 64.91 14.50 1.93 0.055 0.28
High emotional stories 100 20–100 71.20 14.85 71.56 14.38 70.53 15.67 0.47 0.640 0.07
Low emotional stories 100 20–100 63.42 19.91 66.11 19.47 59.04 19.65 2.47 0.014 0.36
aPercentage of altruistic decisions.
Intercorrelations between moral decision making scores are also
listed in Table 2.
Depending on the applied moral decision making score
(overall, high emotional, low emotional), altruistic moral
decisions were differentially related to reasoning, emotional
empathy, and executive functions (Table 2): Overall altruistic
moral decisions were related to emotional empathy and executive
functions (i.e., cognitive flexibility as measured by correct
answers and perseverative errors in the MCST), whereas low
emotional altruistic moral decisions were related to reasoning
(LPS-4), emotional empathy, and executive functions (i.e.,
cognitive flexibility and planning as measured by correct answers
and perseverative and non-perseverative errors in the MCST
and the Key Search Test). Correlations between low emotional
moral decision making and cognitive empathy/ToM as measured
by the IRI perspective taking score and the E-Scale cognitive
concern score failed significance after correction for multiple
comparisons (Table 2). Altruistic moral decision making in high
emotional situations was only related to emotional empathy.
Intercorrelations between neuropsychological variables are listed
in Table 4. These show that emotional empathy measures are
intercorrelated, related to the cognitive empathy/ToM scores, and
are correlated with the LPS raw score which is not controlled
for age effects. The LPS raw score is also related to cognitive
empathy/ToM scores as well as to executive functions. The age-
controlled LPS norm score, however, is only correlated with
measures of executive functions which supports our integration
of these measures to a composite operationalization of “executive
reasoning.” Finally, ToM as measured by the RMET is not
correlated to cognitive empathy questionnaire measures, except
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for the E-Scale cognitive sensitivity factor. Therefore a conceptual
overlap is indicated. No other significant correlations were
found.
Sex Effects on Neuropsychological
Measures and Moral Decision Making
Female and male participants did not differ in terms of age
and education or any neuropsychological test scores except for
higher cognitive flexibility in men with medium effect sizes and
higher emotional empathy scores in women with large effect sizes
(Table 1).
Female and male participants’ moral decisions significantly
differed in low emotional moral decisions with a medium effect
size indicating that women made more altruistic moral decisions
(Table 3).
For overall moral decision making and high emotional moral
decisions, no significant differences between women and men
were found.
Mediation of Age and Sex Effects on
Moral Decision Making
A SEM was calculated with age and sex (dummy-coded with
1 = female and 2 = male sex) as predictors, emotional
empathy and reasoning as hypothesized mediators and
moral decision making as dependent variable. For latent
variables, two manifest variables were chosen that fit the
construct on theoretical considerations outlined above
and highly correlated with both, age and moral decision
making. Because none of the applied cognitive empathy/ToM
measures was correlated with both age and moral decision
making, cognitive empathy/ToM could not be included in the
SEM.
Therefore, only emotional empathy and reasoning were
introduced to the SEM and measured on a latent level. Emotional
empathy was represented as latent variable by the manifest
variables IRI empathic concern and E-Scale emotional concern
score, because they fit to the applied construct of emotional
empathy and exhibited the highest correlations with moral
decision making and were substantially correlated with age. The
latent variable reasoning was measured by the manifest variables
correct trials of the MCST and the raw score of the LPS-4. Correct
trials of the MCST were chosen, because cognitive flexibility is
hereby represented by successful set-shifting operations, and the
raw score of the LPS-4 was chosen, because it measures logical
reasoning abilities that are not controlled for age differences. Both
variables were additionally highly correlated with age and moral
decision making.
We included low emotional moral decisions as dependent
variable in the SEM for two reasons: Firstly, only this
subscale was correlated significantly with age, emotional empathy
and executive reasoning. Likewise, sex differences were only
significant for low emotional but not high emotional moral
decisions. Therefore, the requirements for mediation analyses
were fulfilled only for the low emotional moral dilemmas.
Secondly, the overall score of the moral decisions was not used,
although there were some significant correlations with other
variables of interest, because the low emotional moral decisions
contribute 50% to the total score. Given that the two subscales
of the moral dilemmas were differently correlated with other
variables, it would be inappropriate to sum up the scores and use
this as one dependent variable in the SEM.
The results show that the positive relationship between age
and altruistic moral decisions in low emotional situations as well
as sex differences are fully mediated by emotional empathy, but
not by reasoning. The proposed theoretical model fitted the data
very well: The RMSEA was lower than 0.001 with a 90% CI
of [0.000, 0.082] and a PCLOSE (probability that the RMSEA
is lower than 0.05) of 75.3%. The CFI was 1.000, the TLI was
1.003, and the SRMR was 0.026, all indicating an excellent fit.
The X2 test was not significant, X2 = 7.76, p = 0.457, which
means that the theoretical model fits to the empirical data.
In summary the theoretical model fitted the data excellently.
A significant proportion of the variance in moral decision making
was explained by the SEM (R2 = 0.202, p= 0.001). The mediation
model with all direct and indirect effects is shown in Figure 1. In
this model, the direct effects of age and sex on moral decision
making were not significant. The direct effects of age and sex on
reasoning and emotional empathy were significant. The positive
β-weight for the effect of sex on reasoning means male sex is
associated to better reasoning, while the negative β-weight for the
effect of sex on emotional empathy means female sex is associated
to better emotional empathy. For the latent variables, only the
direct effect of emotional empathy on moral decision making
was significant with higher emotional empathy promoting more
altruistic moral decisions.
The indirect effects of age and sex on moral decision making
were not significant over reasoning (age: β = 0.050, p = 0.498;
sex: β = −0.013, p = 0.517), but over emotional empathy (age:
β = 0.079, p = 0.022; sex: β = −0.122, p = 0.009). This
means that only emotional empathy, but not reasoning, mediates
significantly age and sex effects on moral decision making.
Additional Analyses
Given the bivariate correlations between the subtests
representing reasoning and moral decision making (low
emotional dilemmas), but no direct effect of reasoning on moral
decision making in the SEM, we tested a reduced model to
inspect these results further. Firstly, we calculated the SEM
without the mediator emotional empathy. In this model, we
again found a significant effect of age on reasoning (on latent
level) with β = −0.615, p < 0.001, but no direct effect of
reasoning on moral decision making (β = −0.115, p = 0.348).
Interestingly, the direct effect of age on moral decision making
remained significant (β = 0.205, p = 0.041) in this reduced
model without emotional empathy as a mediator. Sex had also
a significant effect on reasoning (β = 0.164, p = 0.029), but
the direct effect of sex on moral decision making slightly failed
to reach significance (β = −0.135, p = 0.053). Secondly, we
also calculated partial correlations between the two subtests of
reasoning and moral decision making (low emotional dilemmas)
controlled for age. These partial correlations were not significant
(MCST correct r = −0.096, p = 0.182; LPS-4 r = −0.048,
p= 0.504).
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FIGURE 1 | Results of the structural equation model including factor loadings of the latent dimensions, β -weights, p-values, and residuals. ∗p < 0.05,
∗∗∗p < 0.001.
DISCUSSION
The current study examined effects of age and sex on moral
decision making and their mediation by emotional empathy,
(executive) reasoning and cognitive empathy/ToM functions.
We found main effects of (higher) age and (female) sex on
altruistic moral decision making on a bivariate level, but
these direct effects were fully mediated by emotional empathy
in the SEM. Reasoning, although also correlated with both
the predictors and the dependent variable on a bivariate
level, did not mediate the effect of age and sex on moral
decision making significantly. Lastly, even though theoretically
hypothesized, cognitive empathy/ToM could not be included
in the SEM, because no cognitive empathy/ToM subscale
correlated significantly with both moral decision making and
age on a bivariate level. In summary, our hypotheses of positive
relationships between altruistic moral decision making and age as
well as sex were confirmed, and our mediation hypotheses were
confirmed for emotional empathy.
Therefore, the current data indicate that individual
performance of age- and sex-related moral decision making
is established by age and sex effects on emotional empathy, i.e.,
that altruistic moral decision making is related to greater levels
of emotional empathy in older people and people of female sex.
This finding is interesting and brings up two central questions:
Why do advanced age and female sex predict higher emotional
empathy scores? Why is emotional empathy mediating the
relationship between age/sex and altruistic moral decisions? In
addition, it is also worth noting that reasoning did not mediate
the effect of age and sex on moral decision, although it was
correlated with all these variables on a bivariate level, and that
cognitive empathy/ToM was not systematically correlated with
age and moral decisions. These issues are discussed in detail
below.
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 10 April 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 67
fnbeh-10-00067 April 9, 2016 Time: 14:17 # 11
Rosen et al. Empathy Mediates Moral Decision Making
Emotional Empathy
In line with former studies (e.g., Hein et al., 2011; Van der
Graaff et al., 2014), our results underpin the central role of
emotional empathy in altruistic moral decision making. As a
possible explanation, Batson (2010) proposed that empathic
concern motivates altruistic behavior and hereby highlights
prosocial goals. Interestingly, calculating the mediation of the
observed age and sex effects on altruistic moral decisions was
only possible for the low emotional moral decisions as dependent
variable, but not for the high emotional moral decisions. This
was caused by the differential correlation pattern for low vs.
high emotional moral decisions. While all requirements for
mediation analyses were fulfilled for the low emotional moral
decisions, the high emotional decisions were unrelated to age
and sex and to most of the other variables included in the SEM.
Thus, obviously the low and high emotional moral decisions
tap into different psychological processes. It might be argued
that, as high emotional moral situations evoke higher emotional
arousal (Starcke et al., 2011), these decisions are driven by strong
emotional empathic reactions and moral intuitions (Haidt, 2001;
Batson, 2010; Hein et al., 2011) which might be not susceptible
to relatively subtle age- and sex-related differences in emotional
empathy (in contrast to decisions in low emotional dilemmas).
These altruistic, less “flexible” intuitions are considered to derive
from an ontogenetically early developed “moral sense” that is
founded on the development of neural pathways such as the
hypothalamic-limbic axis and their connections to the prefrontal
cortex as well as the internalization of social norms and values,
both influenced by parents, peers and communities (Narvaez and
Lapsley, 2009). Consequently, strong aversive affective reactions
are needed to interfere with high emotional moral decisions,
as it has been shown for aversive affective states that are
induced through stress (Starcke et al., 2011). Furthermore, it
was shown that egoistic moral decisions are accompanied by
aversive affective states (Sommer et al., 2010) – making it less
likely to overcome these in high emotional dilemmas. This effect
is reflected in our data, given that the mean scores of altruistic
decisions in the high emotional dilemmas were descriptively
higher with a smaller variance than the scores in the low
emotional dilemmas, and sex effects were not shown at all for the
high emotional stories. Thus, in low emotional dilemmas, a less
intuitive decision is more likely, so that here, age- and sex-related
levels of empathic concern facilitates altruistic moral decisions
(Beadle et al., 2015).
Although the existing literature on age-related increases in
emotional empathy is controversial (May and Alligood, 2000;
Bailey et al., 2008; Grühn et al., 2008; O’Brien et al., 2013), the
observed positive age effect on emotional empathy in our study
is consistent with the results of Gould and Macneil Gautreau
(2014), who found higher empathic concern in older as compared
to younger adults. The increase of emotional empathy with
advancing age and its importance for moral decisions can be
interpreted in the light of the socioemotional selectivity theory
(Carstensen et al., 1999; Carstensen, 2006) which posits that
with increasing age – and with the increasing awareness of the
finiteness of the own life – there is a motivational shift toward
more affective and especially more positive stimuli (also called
the “positivity effect”), whereas negative affective information
is actively avoided (e.g., Charles et al., 2009). This change in
motivation is also regarded to be associated with the relatively
stable emotional well-being with increasing age in spite of
cognitive and physical losses (e.g., Mather et al., 2012). It also
leads to preferences for social interactions that are emotionally
gainful, rather than serving other goals such as information
seeking. In this sense, higher emotional empathy may be one
central function that enables elderly people to approach these
preferred social interactions or behaviors and avoid negative
affective reactions that arise from moral violations (Sommer
et al., 2010). This interpretation is in line with the finding
that induced emotional empathy facilitates prosocial behavior
in older adults stronger than in younger adults (Beadle et al.,
2015). Altruistic behavior, i.e., actions away from the own egoistic
interests and toward social concern and communal welfare,
can be interpreted as one expression of this behavior, induced
by emotional empathy. This should be particularly the case
in dilemmas which are not emotionally described and of high
impact for the own person.
Our finding of higher emotional empathy in women than in
men is consistent with broader evidence for such sex effects in
all ages from adolescence through late adulthood (O’Brien et al.,
2013; Van der Graaff et al., 2014). It also fits with results that
women exhibit a higher likelihood for emotional contagion and
a greater intensity of emotional experiences in social situations
assessed by self-report and electrophysiological measures (Brody
and Hall, 2008). Furthermore, women typically show greater
kindness and consideration for others’ needs than men (e.g.,
compassion for cheated persons) and are more likely to help and
share and less likely to harm others (Jaffee and Hyde, 2000; Brody
and Hall, 2008).
The relationship of sex and moral decision making, mediated
by emotional empathy, could reflect recent findings about
greater effort that women put in the prevention of harm in
moral conflicts, in which women more than men searched
for additional options beyond the scope of the conflict’s
immediate context (Migliore et al., 2014). Thus, more emotional
empathy in women – and probably other processes related
to the consideration of other persons’ interests and worrying
about a positive outcome for them – accounts for the fact
that more altruistic decisions are made and that woman
typically show a stronger “moral sense” (Fumagalli et al., 2010a)
than men.
Sex effects regarding emotional empathy and in consequence,
also moral decisions, are – at least partly – consistent with
sex-related social roles, goals and motives (Brody and Hall,
2008; Fumagalli et al., 2010a), given that many of the moral
dilemmas used in our study include social interactions. Culturally
shaped stereotypes and socialized sex roles contribute to the
outlined effects because girls’ socialization is more often related
to responsibility for others’ well-being (e.g., as child caretaker)
and boys’ socialization more often is related to self-assertion,
power and status (e.g., as economic provider; Brody, 1997;
Fumagalli et al., 2010a). Furthermore, personality factors as
well as cognitive, affective and situational factors contribute
to sex differences in socio-emotional processing (Brody, 1997)
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which may have an impact on moral decision making (e.g.,
Haviv and Leman, 2002). Also beyond sex roles, biological
factors may account for the sex effects in moral decision
making (Fumagalli et al., 2010a,b; Youssef et al., 2012).
Integrating these arguments, the sex effects on decision making in
everyday moral dilemmas may be explained by biological factors
(like dispositions and sex-related neural differences), together
with socialization and culturally shaped sex roles, which are
additionally considered important for self-reported emotional
empathy. This notion is corroborated by developmental studies
focusing on childhood development of social cognition and
morality (e.g., Decety et al., 2011; Van der Graaff et al.,
2014).
Taken together, it appears plausible that emotional empathy
mediated the observed age- and sex-related increase of altruistic
moral decisions. Our data give evidence for increasing emotional
empathy with advancing age (evidenced for an age range from
18 to 86 years and thus for a time span from early to late
adulthood) and higher emotional empathy in women and the
central function of this higher empathic concern for altruistic
moral decision making.
Reasoning
Consistent with many previous studies (e.g., Head et al., 2009;
Hodzik and Lemaire, 2011; Borghesani et al., 2013), we found
a very strong effect of age on reasoning, operationalized by the
subtest 4 of the LPS and the MCST. However, contradictory
to our hypotheses, we did not find a mediating effect of
reasoning on the relationship between age and moral decision
making, and even the direct effect from reasoning to moral
decision making was not significant in the SEM (even not in
the reduced SEM without emotional empathy as mediator).
This was the case, although there were significant correlations
between both subtests of reasoning and moral decision making
on a bivariate level. The additional analyses indeed showed
that these bivariate correlations did not remain significant
when being controlled for age in partial correlations, indicating
that age, but not reasoning, is the relevant variable that
can explain variance in moral decision making. And these
age effects are mediated by emotional empathy, but not by
reasoning.
The effect of reasoning on moral decision making was
expected, because altruistic intuitions that promote situationally
proposed behaviors might be overridden for the pursuit of
personal aims by means of reasoning and executive control
(Greene et al., 2004; Kahane et al., 2012; Paxton et al., 2012).
Given that reasoning has been proposed to be related to the
resolution of cognitive conflict, which is an ingredient of solving
moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2004; Patterson et al., 2012),
cognitive control functions should theoretically have an impact
on moral decision making per se and on the relationship
between age and moral decision making in particular. Our
current data do not represent these theoretical arguments. We
have to notice, however, that the structure of the reasoning
tasks used in the current study only covers certain subprocesses
of executive functioning and cognitive conflict monitoring. It
seems worth investigating in future studies whether reasoning
and executive components, which are more closely related
to conflict processing and decision making in general, may
explain additional variance of moral decision making across the
lifespan.
In the same direction, we found effects of sex on reasoning,
but the indirect effect of sex on moral decision making was not
significant, which is caused by the non-significant direct effect
of reasoning on moral decision making (see above). It should
be noted that our findings regarding sex effects on reasoning
and executive functions is inhomogenous, as performance in
planning, as operationalized by the key search test, and raw scores
in the LPS 4 did not differ between men and women. However,
this pattern reflects previous studies showing inconsistent results
with either no effects (e.g., Kim et al., 2013) or small effects in
very specific cognitive-executive domains with advantages for
women typically in verbal cognitive and pair association tasks
and for men in processing speed and visuospatial processing (e.g.,
Portin et al., 1995). Hereby, it is suggested that sex effects in
executive performance depend on the executive function that is
measured. Obviously, sex-specific reasoning functions do not add
substantial information to understanding the effects of sex on
moral decision making.
In summary, emotional empathy mediates the age and sex
effects on moral decision making, whereas executive reasoning
does not mediate these effects, although it was related to egoistic
moral decisions on a bivariate level. However, it seems too
early to give a final statement on the assumption that age
and sex effects on moral decision making can be explained
independent of reasoning abilities, because reasoning should
theoretically influence the process of moral decision making in
many ways, such as emotion regulation, cognitive reflection,
and post hoc justification (Haidt, 2001; Patterson et al., 2012;
Paxton et al., 2012). The present study investigated executive
reasoning abilities represented by logical reasoning, cognitive
flexibility, and planning performance without testing their
specific application to the moral problem itself. Furthermore,
other executive funtions that were not tested in the curent
study might influence moral confict processing, such as problem
solving, interference control and response inhibition (Patterson
et al., 2012; Diamond, 2013). The role of reasoning and other
executive functions might therefore be underestimated and
further studies are needed which assess specifically how reasoning
skills are applied to moral problems and additionally use a
broader range of tests assessing specific cognitive functions and
reasoning abilities.
Cognitive Empathy/Theory of Mind
Cognitive empathy/ToM was associated to age, but not to moral
decision making. The RMET and the cognitive sensitivity factor
of the E-Scale, which were aggregated to a composite cognitive
empathy/ToM domain, were negatively related to age, but not
to moral decision making. Therefore, cognitive empathy/ToM
could not be included in our mediation model, because the
requirements of bivariate correlations among the predictor,
the mediators and the dependent variable were not fulfilled.
As indicated by the intercorrelations of ToM and cognitive
empathy measures, a possible reason for our finding that different
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cognitive empathy/ToM measures relate to age as opposed to
moral decision making can be deduced by the fact that ToM
and cognitive empathy were measured by the different tasks.
The RMET is a power test and assesses the capability of ToM
usage. However, the RMET does not inform us about the extent
to which ToM is applied in different contexts. In contrast, the
self-report questionnaire measures of cognitive empathy (i.e., the
IRI perspective taking score and the cognitive sensitivity factor of
the E-Scale) express the readiness to use ToM functions and the
extent to which ToM is applied to appropriate situations. This
issue cannot be resolved by the current data and needs further
clarification in future studies. In the present SEM, potential
mediation effects of cognitive empathy/ToM in the context of
age, sex and moral decision making could not be resolved due to
insufficient prerequisites and therefore remain issues for further
studies with a more elaborative test battery assessing cognitive
empathy/ToM skills.
Considering the correlational results, the observed age-related
decline in cognitive empathy/ToM is in line with previous reports
of diminished cognitive empathy/ToM in old age, which is
discussed to be partly related to cognitive-executive decline (e.g.,
Charlton et al., 2009; Phillips et al., 2011). Further it fits to age-
related social motivational changes as described above as well as
evidence that moral permissibility judgments in older adults are
more likely outcome driven than in younger adults (Moran et al.,
2012).
Contradicting the observed correlations between cognitive
empathy/ToM and altruistic moral decision making that slightly
failed significance, cognitive empathy/ToM was found associated
to more frequent egoistic decisions in a previous study
investigating everyday moral decisions in a sample of adults with
a mean age of 62 years (Rosen et al., 2013). However, these
assumingly inconsistent relations are established by different
cognitive empathy/ToM measures, the IRI perspective taking
score and the E-Scale cognitive concern score in the present
study and the RMET in the former study. Therefore, cognitive
empathy/ToM might be used differently in the context of
moral decision making (e.g., depending on the applied cognitive
empathy/ToM measure) and it may depend on how meaningful
social contextual information are accounted for (Baez et al.,
2012), e.g., other people’s intentions (Young et al., 2010; Killen
et al., 2011).
On the basis of our results, one might have the impression that
cognitive empathy/ToM is unsystematically related to both age
and moral decision making. Given that cognitive empathy/ToM
is a multi-dimensional construct (Adolphs, 2001), these results
are preliminary and a more detailed definition of cognitive
empathy/ToM subfunctions supposed to be related to both age-
sensitive changes and moral decision making should be the basis
for further research.
Limitations
There are several limitations that influence the results of
the current investigation. First there are only few tests that
represent emotional empathy, executive reasoning, and cognitive
empathy/ToM. Executive reasoning was measured by tests
that assess logical reasoning, cognitive flexibility and planning,
whereas other components like problem solving, response
inhibition are not measured. Emotional empathy and cognitive
empathy/ToM are mostly assessed by questionnaire measures.
Future studies should use an elaborative test battery assessing
these functions in more detail and with more tasks in order to
have a full SEM on latent level including all theoretically plausible
mediators. In addition, further tasks assessing moral dilemmas
are needed in order to also include the dependent variable on
latent level in the SEM.
The fact that only one moral decision making paradigm was
used in the current study did not only limit the modeling of
the dependent variable on manifest level, but also reduce the
generalization of the findings. Future studies should compare
everyday moral decisions to extreme moral dilemma situations
and how emotional empathy, executive reasoning, and cognitive
empathy/ToM potentially contribute to making decisions in both
paradigms. Moral permissibility ratings on moral transgressions
could also be included to investigate the influence of the
abovementioned functions on a third person observer’s appraisal.
Interesting variables that probably influence moral decision
making and need further investigation are moral intuitions
(Graham et al., 2011), that have been shown to be altered in
criminal offenders (Aharoni et al., 2011), and affective states
that might influence moral decisions like anxiety, anger, or guilt
(Polman and Ruttan, 2011), because lower levels of anger and
anxiety in older adults have recently been reported (Shallcross
et al., 2013).
Due to the cross-sectional design of the study, intra-individual
changes of moral decision making cannot be described, and the
age-related changes observed might be the result of cohort effects.
Age-related effects on emotional empathy, for example, have
earlier been interpreted as cohort effects rather than genuinely
developmental effects (Grühn et al., 2008; O’Brien et al., 2013).
However, the reported cohort effects in O’Brien et al. (2013)
are inconsistent with the current findings, as younger cohorts
in that study showed higher emotional empathy, whereas older
cohorts showed lower emotional empathy scores. In contrast, the
older cohorts in our study scored higher on emotional empathy
measures. Future research with longitudinal study designs, which
allow to identify intra-individual changes, may clarify these
issues.
Finally, it has to be considered that the obtained sex
differences are found for uneven sample sizes. We have
investigated a rather large total sample; however, the ratio of
women and men was approximately 1.5:1. This might have
biased the obtained sex effects. Consequently, sex effects on
neuropsychological functions remain a topic of discussion.
Furthermore, the impact of different socialization and sex roles
can be a biasing cohort effect. Future research should address
these issues.
CONCLUSION
The current study shows that age and sex effects on moral
decision making are mediated by emotional empathy. In other
words, older age and female sex increase the probability of
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being more empathic and this explains more altruistic moral
decision making. Thus, age and sex differences converge to
higher emotional empathy abilities that determine the frequency
of altruistic moral decisions. The level of emotional empathy
which older adults and/or adults of female sex more likely
show than younger and/or male adults is more crucial for
the promotion of altruistic moral decisions than age or sex
themselves.
Further research is needed to investigate in which way
emotional empathy and possible other neuropsychological
functions interact with moral decision making in the context
of everyday and extreme moral conflicts as well as moral
permissibility ratings. Also, the role of moral attitudes and
affective states like anxiety, anger and guilt in the context of
age- and sex-effects on moral decision making needs future
investigations.
Moral decision making is an essential component of
communal life and human societies on the whole. Commitment
to social prescriptions as well as flexible behavioral adjustment
to social challenges are necessary elements of a person’s ability
to manage social intercourse on the one hand, and advocate
personal interests on the other hand. Our results may help to
explain uneven age and sex distributions concerning specific
characteristics of western societies, for example in volunteer
work and social and economic professions as well as in forensic
statistics (Fumagalli et al., 2010a). Furthermore, they may
contribute to debates on social inclusion and socio-emotional
self-actualization in an aging society.
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